On February 26, 2022, Ukraine’s digital minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, asked Elon Musk on Twitter for help. Musk agreed. SpaceX switched on Starlink service across the country, and the first shipment of terminals landed two days later, on February 28.
Russia had been going after Ukrainian communications from the first hours of the invasion. An hour before the troops crossed the border on February 24, cyberattacks knocked out Viasat, the satellite company that served Ukraine. Ukrainians tried commercial radios, but those could be overheard. Starlink looked like the answer, and SpaceX waived its usual monthly fee for the country.
From hospitals to front lines
Ukrainian regulators let anyone use it, including ordinary citizens and businesses. By April 2022 the government had registered Starlink officially and leaned on it for a range of needs. It carried President Zelenskyy’s broadcast, got mobile operators talking to each other again, and went to hospitals, which received 600 terminals in a month. Ukrainian Railways used it. So did the teams planning evacuations. About 150,000 people used the system each day in May 2022.
The military took to it fast. In March 2022, a SpaceX operations director reported that Starlink kits let Ukraine’s armed forces keep theater command centers running. The service linked a special operations brigade by voice and connected the military to the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command. That same month, two helicopters flew Ukrainian special forces fighters, weapons and the first Starlink terminal behind enemy lines to besieged Mariupol.
Soon after, drone crews were using it to fly strike and reconnaissance missions and to send back video that corrected artillery fire. Soldiers uploaded images of possible targets in real time while commanders chose where to hit. Some drone operators went further and strapped terminals to strike drones, a trick they suspected would worry SpaceX.
In April and May 2022, thousands of troops cut off at Azovstal in Mariupol used it to publish photos and videos before they surrendered in May. By March 2024, a Ukrainian drone boat was patrolling the Black Sea with a terminal on board. In October 2026, George Barros of the Institute for the Study of War called the network “the backbone of military communications in Ukraine.”
Units camouflage their terminals with cardboard or trash so Russian drones do not spot them, and cool them in summer to hide the heat signature from thermal cameras.
The catch: one owner
The same dependence worries analysts. In 2022, Musk denied a Ukrainian request to extend coverage to Russian-occupied Crimea during a counterattack on a Crimean port. Providing it would have violated U.S. sanctions. Media reports wrongly described this as Musk “turning off” Starlink. SpaceX also voiced concern about escalation if the system was used offensively, and geofencing limits and a refused naval drone strike in Crimea showed the risk of relying on a privately run network. After Musk raised concerns about sustaining free access, U.S. intervention led to a Department of Defense contract in 2023. One account from the Ukrainians involved says they “originally overlooked the significance of” Musk’s personal control.
Jamming is harder than it sounds. Starlink uses narrow beams in the Ku and Ka bands, so a jammer must aim precisely at an antenna, which means getting within sight of Ukrainian troops. The data is encrypted, and terminals reject unencrypted signals.
Russia learned to use the system too. Reports of Russian terminals surfaced in February 2024, and by September 2024 reports said Shahed drones carried Starlink antennas. In February 2026, Starlink cut off every terminal in Ukraine that was not on a whitelist. On X, Musk wrote: “Looks like the steps we took to stop the unauthorized use of Starlink by Russia have worked.”
