The name is Latin for “Silicon Peace,” and the idea behind it is plain enough: line up friendly countries so that no single one of them depends on China for chips, AI computing or the minerals that go into both. Pax Silica is a US-led initiative coordinated by the State Department. It launched in December 2025 with a non-binding declaration.
The initiative never names Beijing as its target. It does implicitly aim at reducing reliance on China and countering its dominance in these fields.
How it started
On December 11, 2025, the State Department announced the first Pax Silica Summit and called the project its flagship effort on AI and supply-chain security. The summit met in Washington on December 12, and seven countries signed the declaration. Taiwan, the European Union, Canada and the OECD took part as guests.
US officials presented it as an economic-security framework for “trusted partners” that host major technology firms and key industrial capacity. A State Department fact sheet listed areas of cooperation: connectivity and data infrastructure, compute and semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, logistics, mineral refining and processing, and energy. The initiative calls itself a “positive-sum” partnership meant to cut “coercive dependencies” along the whole chain, from mining through chip fabrication to computing.
Akhil Ramesh of Pacific Forum, writing in the National Interest, said the effort starts from the view that “economic security today is inseparable from control over energy, critical minerals, high-end manufacturing, and advanced models.”
Money has followed, slowly. In early 2026 the US announced plans to put $250 million into an investment consortium meant to strengthen energy and critical mineral supply chains. Reuters reported talks on projects tied to trade and logistics routes and an industrial park in Israel. Gulf states such as the UAE and Qatar are betting that cheap energy will draw AI companies.
Who has joined
The Netherlands joined on December 17, 2025, as a “non-signing partner.” The UAE followed on January 14, 2026. The Philippines signed on April 17, the European Union on June 23, and Kazakhstan on June 26. Estonia, an observer, signed the declaration the same day. On August 1, US special envoy Sergio Gor invited Bangladesh to join.
The Philippine test case
The Philippines offers the clearest look at what the initiative means on the ground. The proposal there is a 4,000-acre industrial hub for semiconductor and other advanced electronics production in the Luzon Economic Corridor. It would start with a 1,619-hectare AI industrial hub in New Clark City, Tarlac, and expand later to cover more of the AI supply chain.
A Congressional Research Service report in 2026 projected that China could hold 38.2% of global mature-node chip production by 2030. Mature-node chips accounted for 88% of global chip sales by volume in 2023.
Supporters say foreign capital in a special economic zone could help the Philippines climb the production chain and gain technical knowledge. Trade and Industry Undersecretary Ceferino Rodolfo said the foreign companies would have to cover the social cost of their projects without added government subsidies.
Opposition came quickly. In April 2026, farmer and fisher groups, among them KMP, PKSM and Pamalakaya, objected to converting farm and coastal land. KMP called the economic security zone a “massive sellout” and warned of land conversion, resource extraction, environmental damage and displaced communities. The STOP US War coalition, which includes AGHAM, the Computer Professionals’ Union and the Kalikasan People’s Network for the Environment, warned of “resource plunder” and said the country’s nickel, copper, cobalt, chromite and rare earth deposits could be pulled into foreign-led supply chains. Environmental groups pointed to the electricity and water that chip and AI facilities consume.
In May 2026, the Makabayan Bloc questioned sovereignty and governance arrangements, including reported special legal arrangements for foreign personnel. Government agencies and project backers said the development would stay under Philippine law and regulatory oversight.
The immunity dispute
On May 18, during a site visit by Jacob Helberg, US Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, Bases Conversion and Development Authority president Joshua Bingcang said Washington had asked that the New Clark City zone operate under US law and that US personnel get diplomatic immunity. The Philippine government refused, Bingcang said, and held that the project stays under Philippine law and jurisdiction.
Helberg denied it on May 25. In a post on X he said his earlier remarks had been “taken out of context” and that the US position was meant to give investors legal certainty and predictability, not diplomatic immunity. A State Department spokesperson later declined to address the gap between Helberg’s account and the Philippine officials’ statements.
In the EU, some policymakers and analysts raised concerns in May and June over regulatory autonomy as accession talks moved forward. Critics argued that joining could affect the bloc’s strategic autonomy on export controls and semiconductor policy.
