Seven countries signed the Pax Silica Declaration at a summit in Washington on December 12, 2025. The name is Latin for “Silicon Peace,” and the pact is a U.S.-led effort to secure supply chains for semiconductors, artificial intelligence and rare earth elements. The initiative implicitly aims at reducing reliance on China and countering its dominance in those fields.
The State Department coordinates the effort and calls it its flagship project on AI and supply-chain security. The declaration is non-binding. Taiwan, the European Union, Canada and the OECD took part in the opening summit as guests rather than signatories.
Who has joined since
The roster has kept growing. The United Arab Emirates joined on January 14, 2026, and the Philippines signed on April 17. The European Union signed on June 23. Three days later, on June 26, Kazakhstan and Estonia both signed. Qatar was publicly named as a prospective signatory back in January.
What it covers
A State Department fact sheet lists six areas of cooperation: connectivity and data infrastructure, compute and semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, logistics, mineral refining and processing, and energy. The initiative describes itself as a “positive-sum” partnership meant to reduce “coercive dependencies” from mineral extraction through to chip manufacturing. In early 2026 the United States announced plans to put $250 million into an investment consortium for energy and critical mineral supply chains.
Friction in the Philippines and Brussels
The Philippine plan is the most concrete project so far: a proposed 4,000-acre (about 1,618-hectare) AI and advanced manufacturing hub in New Clark City, Tarlac, within the Luzon Economic Corridor.
It has drawn fire. Farmers’ organizations including Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas called the proposed economic security zone a “massive sellout” and warned of land conversion and displaced farming and fishing communities. A coalition of scientists and environmental groups, Scientists and Technologists Oppose the US War, said the initiative could enable “resource plunder.”
In the European Union, some policymakers and analysts argued in May and June that joining could cut into the bloc’s strategic autonomy on export controls and semiconductor policy. Supporters countered that it would strengthen supply-chain resilience.
Then came a dispute over legal status. On May 18, during a site visit by Under Secretary of State Jacob Helberg, Joshua Bingcang, president of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, said the United States had asked that the zone run under U.S. law and that its personnel receive diplomatic immunity. The Philippine government refused, he said. A week later, on May 25, Helberg wrote on X that his earlier remarks had been “taken out of context” and that Washington wanted legal certainty for investors, not diplomatic immunity. A State Department spokesperson later declined to address the gap between his account and the Philippine officials’ statements.
