MOSCOW, July 25 — The shift in how Russia wages conflict is no longer just about tanks and troops. For decades, Moscow has fused technical network attacks with psychological operations — an approach it calls *informatsionnoye protivoborstvo*, or information confrontation — and the trend underneath is clear: cyber operations are now a standing instrument of statecraft, not a wartime exception.
Since the 1990s, units of the GRU, FSB, and SVR have directed hacker collectives — APT28, APT29, Sandworm, Turla, and Star Blizzard — against governments, critical infrastructure, and civil society across Europe, North America, and Asia. The playbook runs from denial-of-service campaigns and hacking operations to disinformation programs and state-directed online repression. All of it is designed to advance Kremlin geopolitical objectives.
From Estonia to NotPetya: A Record of Disruption
The 2007 distributed denial-of-service attacks on Estonia were an early signal. They showed that a small Baltic nation could be paralysed without a single soldier crossing a border. Then came the cyber strikes that accompanied the 2008 war with Georgia. By the time Russian forces moved into Ukraine, sustained intrusions had already targeted the country’s election systems and power grids. The trend accelerated in 2017 with the NotPetya malware campaign, which spread far beyond Ukraine and caused global financial losses. Democratic contests in the United States, Germany, and across the European Union were also targeted. Moscow sustained covert influence networks, including the Voice of Europe operation.
The Doctrine Behind the Operations
Russia codified its approach in the 2016 Information Security Doctrine. That document defines information security broadly — covering data, infrastructure, and human processes. It sets goals to protect information sovereignty, secure critical systems and state secrets, safeguard constitutional rights and public order online, and promote domestic technology. The doctrine also identifies foreign states, organizations, and individuals as potential threats, directing all government branches to coordinate responses. There is nothing defensive about the framing: it licenses both internal control and external influence.
Surveillance and Suppression at Home
Russian intelligence agencies also use surveillance tools like the SORM system to monitor and suppress online dissent. This is not just about foreign targets. The information confrontation doctrine applies at home too. The Federal Security Service manages internal security, counterintelligence, and information security; military intelligence conducts external operations including cyber intrusion and disruption; civil agencies and state-aligned media support messaging campaigns. Overlapping responsibilities mean multiple security agencies are involved.
International Responses and What Comes Next
The international response has been fragmented but growing. Sanctions, coordinated attribution statements, and joint action have become more common. NATO created the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. After the Viasat attack during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, allies moved together to attribute and respond. Watch this space. Moscow shows no sign of dialling back its information confrontation strategy. The tools are embedded in doctrine, the units are active, and the targets keep expanding. What’s changing is the speed of attribution and the willingness of Western governments to name the attackers publicly. That diplomatic shift may be the trend underneath that matters most.
Sources
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